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WASHINGTON AND CCTV: IT’S 2010, NOT NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 
Aileen B. Xenakis* 
Washington, D.C.’s Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) program and the role 
it plays in homeland security and law enforcement can inform other juris-
dictions in their development of CCTV policies and implementation. Ex-
amining both the process by which Washington, D.C. established its CCTV 
program and the regulations governing it yields a comprehensive under-
standing of the practical issues as well as constitutional issues that arise 
when balancing security, privacy rights, and government transparency. 
Analyzing strategies of successful jurisdictions, preparing to address the 
comments those jurisdictions received, and identifying the gaps remaining 
will improve the efficacy of developing CCTV programs. For an effective, 
efficient CCTV program that reinforces people’s faith in government, de-
partments must draft regulations that clearly articulate their end goal as 
well as the means they plan to use to achieve it.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article identifies best practices for creating successful Closed-
Circuit Television (CCTV) programs, as well as areas to be further ex-
amined in order to implement CCTV technology and policy most effective-
ly. Additionally, this article identifies the legal issues that arise as CCTV 
technology develops more quickly than the law and provides analysis of 
regulations governing the existing CCTV program in Washington, D.C. By 
sharing best practices, analyzing the comments and concerns about CCTV 
technology generated in other jurisdictions, and tailoring regulations to in-
dividual programs, government agencies can create successful CCTV pro-
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grams that make the community safer without sacrificing transparency, civil 
liberties protections, or faith in government. This essential transparency can 
be achieved by (1) drafting clear, straightforward regulations that reflect 
sensitivity to CCTV technology’s potential to be misused; and (2) including 
added protections to assuage concerns. 
II. CCTV GENERALLY 
CCTV programs are becoming the next stage in law enforcement 
technology. Police departments have, with increasing frequency, placed 
agency-owned cameras in public areas and streamed the cameras’ video 
feeds to an observation room, where police department employees can view 
multiple screens and see multiple areas of the city at the same time.1 CCTV 
technology allows an agency employee to be effectively in two places at 
once—or more than two—and to observe what might otherwise require five 
or ten officers.2  
CCTV programs increase efficiency in two critical ways: (1) by 
conserving law enforcement finances; and (2) by decreasing officers’ reac-
tion time. First, it is less expensive to pay one officer to view multiple 
screens and then, during an incident, contact officers in the area of the inci-
dent to respond, than to place an officer on every street corner, or even on 
every corner where a camera is located (which would be prohibitively ex-
pensive). Even then, officers on the street would need to rely on being in the 
right place at the right time whereas the cameras are constantly present. 
Second, CCTV can decrease the response time necessary to arrive at the 
scene and begin addressing an incident. This allows officers to respond 
quickly because they know precisely where to go without having to be in 
the right place at the right time to observe the initiation of an incident. 
CCTV also greatly reduces the miscommunication that is possible when 
relying on 911 operators, dispatchers, or others involved in relaying time-
sensitive messages. The benefit of improved communication is enhanced 
when multiple agencies view their CCTV footage in the same room, often 
called a fusion center.3  
  
 1   See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Chicago’s Camera Network Is Everywhere, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 17, 2009, at B7 (describing how a “giant web of video-surveillance cameras has 
spread across Chicago.”).  
 2   In response to why the Washington, D.C. police began using CCTV cameras to watch 
live images instead of using the cameras solely as an “investigative tool,” Washington, 
D.C.’s Chief of Police “Lanier said that she took action last fall after officials mapped loca-
tions of shootings in the city and realized that the gunfire often was taking place within range 
of the cameras.” Allison Klein, Police Go Live Monitoring D.C. Crime Cameras, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1. 
 3   According to the U.S. Department of Justice: 
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Fusion centers operate on a principle of efficiency that serves a 
broader purpose than traditional law enforcement. To gain situational 
awareness4 or a common operating picture,5 a city would purchase compati-
ble cameras for each agency, for example, the same kind of cameras made 
by the same company for the jurisdiction’s transportation department, 
school system, or emergency management, and send the video feeds from 
all of those cameras to one room. This room, a fusion center, is where em-
ployees from those agencies monitor multiple video feeds.  
Fusion centers allow for immediate communication among em-
ployees of various agencies, thereby minimizing confusion and response 
time. For example, if a transportation department camera reveals an auto-
mobile accident threatening human life, the transportation employee can 
immediately communicate this information to a fire and emergency medical 
services representative, who can begin his agency’s notification and re-
sponse chain. By monitoring the video feed, agency employees can provide 
real-time information to assist first responders in making the best decisions. 
This preferred outcome cannot happen without immediately available in-
formation.  
CCTV programs garner much attention from city governments, in 
particular because of their promise of efficiency and effectiveness. Though 
some opponents argue that cameras may just displace crime,6 this displace-
  
A fusion center is an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information 
and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the abili-
ty to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES: DEVELOPING AND SHARING 
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE IN A NEW ERA (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 3 (Apr. 2006), avail-
able at http://www.iir.com/global/products/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf. 
 4   Situational awareness: 
[R]efers to the capability to maintain a constant vigil over important information, 
understand the relationship among the various pieces of information monitored, 
and project this understanding into the near future to make critical decisions. In 
many ways the term “Situational Awareness” is, in reality, a form of mental book-
keeping.  
Carlos Comperatore & William Abernathy, Situational Awareness: What Is It?, in U.S. 
COAST GUARD, CREW ENDURANCE MANAGEMENT 1 (Summer 2008), http://www.uscg.mil/hq/ 
cg5/cg5211/docs/CEMSnlpubs/Vol_5_Issue2.pdf. 
 5   “The Common Operational Picture . . . provides the integrated capability to receive, 
correlate, and display a common tactical picture, including planning applications and theater-
generated overlays and projections that may include location of friendly, hostile, and neutral 
units, assets, and reference points.” U.S. Joint Forces Command, Situational Awareness 
Fundamentals—Common Operational Picture, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_safcop.html 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2010). 
 6   See generally Sam Waples et al., Does CCTV Displace Crime?, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & 
CRIM. JUST. 207 (2009). See also NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHO’S WATCHING? 
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ment is, in fact, a very effective disruption of crime. The urban crime aris-
ing out of illegal narcotics sales and exchanges is driven by unofficial juris-
dictions, or territories, occupied by certain dealers.7 By displacing a transac-
tion even one block, CCTV cameras disrupt the flow of criminal commerce 
and prevent criminals from establishing comfortable rhythms and patterns.8 
Additionally, general and wide-spread knowledge of cameras, including but 
not limited to the government’s posting of the cameras’ locations, serves 
two critical functions: it deters crime9 and it inspires confidence in the gov-
ernment’s ability to serve and protect its residents, workers, commuters, and 
tourists.10  
III. SHARING BEST PRACTICES FOR CCTV PROGRAMS 
When developing CCTV programs and policies, examining the pro-
grams in other cities, including Baltimore and London, reveals which strat-
egies are most effective in accomplishing different goals. Examining other 
city’s programs is the first step in developing a city’s own CCTV policies. 
Many other cities have developed and implemented CCTV programs, and 
each city has developed its system differently depending on the city’s indi-
vidual goals. Analyzing the differences and benefits other cities provide 
through their CCTV programs is crucial for identifying a city’s own objec-
tives and designing an effective program to accomplish them. 
  
VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE NEED FOR PUBLIC OVERSIGHT 
(2006) [hereinafter NYCLU REPORT], available at http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/surveillance_ 
cams_report_121306.pdf (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/03-748, VIDEO SUR-
VEILLANCE: INFORMATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO 
MONITOR SELECTED FEDERAL PROPERTY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 29 (2003) [hereinafter VIDEO 
SURVEILLANCE] (“There is general consensus among CCTV users, privacy advocates, re-
searchers, and CCTV industry groups that there are few evaluations of the effectiveness of 
CCTV in reducing crime . . . .”)).  
 7   “[Cameras] provide an unquantifiable benefit—drug dealers, for example, prefer not to 
do business directly in front of a surveillance device. So when they walk one block away 
from the camera to deal on a different corner, they’ve lost home-turf advantage.” Arthur 
Delaney, The Watchmen: How Useless are the D.C. Police Department’s Crime Cameras?, 
WASH. CITY PAPER, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/display.php?id= 
36798 (quoting D.C. police union boss Kris Baumann). 
 8   See id. 
 9   This argument generates much debate; very few studies have been published and very 
few statistics are available because few jurisdictions keep data to demonstrate the effective-
ness of their CCTV systems. Opponents argue that there is no way to substantiate this argu-
ment in support of CCTV programs’ implementation. See VIDEO SURVEILLANCE, supra note 
6, at 29–30. 
 10  Citizens in the most crime-ridden neighborhoods, the neighborhood watches, etc., are 
big fans of this program. “‘Regular citizens want those crime cameras up,’ says D.C. police 
union boss Kris Baumann, who never hesitates to criticize the department.” Delaney, supra 
note 7.  
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Part of Baltimore’s pilot CCTV program focused on utilizing a 
small number of cameras concentrated in the city’s downtown economic 
and tourism hub.11 By publicizing the program and posting large signs with-
in monitored areas, Baltimore achieved its goal to discourage—or at least 
displace—crime, and to reassure tourists that it is safe to shop and dine in 
the area.12 Baltimore’s goal was to deter crime and to solve more cases,13 
but, because cameras were concentrated in the downtown area, some argued 
that it just displaced crime.14  
  
 11  See Scott Weaver, Looking into Baltimore, London Cameras, CHARLOTTESVILLE NEWS 
& ARTS, July 10–16, 2007, http://www.c-ville.com/index.php?cat=141404064434008& 
ShowArticle_ID=1143090707369 1218. 
It started small in Baltimore in 1996, just 16 black-and-white cameras bolted to 
light poles and buildings, staring straight down on a single spot, unblinking. But af-
ter a 2005 trip to London—a city 200,000-cameras strong—then-Baltimore mayor 
Martin O’Malley implemented City Watch. It’s a city-wide network of full-color 
closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras that pan, zoom, tilt and are actively  
monitored by police. . . . Cameras were first installed to fight property crime and 
car theft, but even though no one was actually watching, crime dropped 10 to 15 
percent. 
Id. 
 12  See generally id.; John Buntin, Long Lens of the Law, GOVERNING, May 1, 2009, http:// 
www.governing.com/article/long-lens-law. 
 13  Buntin, supra note 12. 
 14  See Justin Fenton, Baltimore, Britain, and the Eyes of the Law, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 
31, 2009, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-12-31/news/bal-te.cameras31dec31_1_came 
ras-cctv-baltimore-sun-sent-police.  
Five years after launching a system that cost at least $5 million and continues to 
grow, Baltimore claims successful results—but is still trying to work out the kinks. 
[Westminster city coordination manager] McAlister gives former Mayor Martin 
O’Malley high praise for his research into CCTV and says Baltimore went big, 
buying some of the highest-quality equipment available at the time. With about 
500 city-controlled cameras today, Baltimore has nearly as many per capita as 
Britain. But he is critical of the way Baltimore implemented the cameras. He said 
cameras were erected in the middle of problem areas, which seemed to make sense. 
But it sent drug dealers scattering, and police scrambling to build new intelligence. 
Meanwhile, pushing dealers to new corners led to an increase in turf battles—
effectively stoking more crime that police were less prepared to combat. . . . Since 
a central watch center opened in December 2008, cameras have aided in 1,600 ar-
rests, about half of them in the downtown business district—a 22 percent increase 
from the prior year. A yet-to-be-published study by the Urban Institute credits 
cameras with a drop in downtown crime, though it also notes an increase in violent 
crime in a buffer area just beyond view of the lens. “While there are mixed feelings 
about whether or not displacement occurs as a result of cameras, many feel that 
Baltimore is reaching a point of camera saturation so that there are very few places 
left to which criminals can displace,” concluded the researcher, Nancy G. La 
Vigne. 
Id. 
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Conversely, London’s goal is a complete view of the entire city at 
all times. London boasts the largest and most extensive CCTV program in 
the world, with over 500,000 cameras.15 As a capital city, London employs 
many cameras in all areas of the city in order to improve situational aware-
ness. The program’s extensiveness makes the CCTV program efficient, both 
cost-wise and in delivering safety, since a government cannot justify invest-
ing money and employee efforts in a system that is not large enough to cap-
ture the activities that pose a threat. CCTV expenditures and research will 
be fruitless if government employees use CCTV to observe a crime and then 
lose their lead as soon as the activity moves out of the scope of the cameras.  
Baltimore’s and London’s programs heavily influenced Washing-
ton, D.C.’s plans for its CCTV program and policy. Washington, D.C.’s 
finished product presents a unique case study; other jurisdictions examining 
the way D.C. constructed its CCTV program will find both the successful 
elements of D.C.’s program as well as the outstanding issues yet to be ad-
dressed. The Washington, D.C. case study illustrates how important it is to 
identify a CCTV program’s purpose clearly and transparently, and to draft 
regulations that are tailored to achieve that purpose while protecting civil 
liberties from being compromised.  
IV. WASHINGTON, D.C.’S CCTV PROGRAM 
Washington, D.C.’s CCTV program, also called the Video Interope-
rability for Public Safety (VIPS) program,16 is a benchmark in CCTV poli-
cymaking, and the process by which the city has developed and imple-
mented its CCTV program can inform other jurisdictions as they develop 
their own CCTV programs. Washington, D.C. provides an excellent exam-
ple of tailoring a CCTV program and using CCTV technology to meet a 
city’s unique needs.  
Other jurisdictions may look to the process by which D.C. estab-
lished its CCTV program to create a checklist of sorts to understand better 
the impact that a CCTV program has on stakeholders. For example, CCTV 
cameras are typically placed in strategic areas, but cameras may need to be 
moved or added if new building structures block camera feeds from viewing 
certain areas, assets, or infrastructure. Depending on the jurisdiction, this 
may implicate the city’s building code and various other areas of legislation 
  
 15  Michael Greenberger, The Need for Closed Circuit Television in Mass Transit Systems, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 151, 152 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=340636 (citing Ken Rodriguez , We’re Caught in Cam-
era’s Eye More Often Than You Realize, SAN-ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, July 31, 2005, at 3A; 
Ready for Your Closeup, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 25, 2005, at B7 (editorial)). 
 16  Press Release, District of Columbia, Mayor Fenty Launches VIPS Program; New Sys-
tem Will Consolidate City’s Closed-Circuit TV Monitoring (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.dc. 
gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=1273. 
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and regulation. There may be different legal procedures for requiring new 
building owners to outfit their structures with compatible video feeds or 
allowing the government to place cameras on the new building. This is just 
one of several peripheral issues affecting the success of a CCTV program. 
Jurisdictions that are just developing new programs can anticipate these 
issues by looking to other programs, such as Washington, D.C.’s, that came 
before theirs. Though there is certainly something to be gained by examin-
ing London’s program, which is the largest and oldest CCTV program in the 
world and has proven success,17 it cannot serve as the only program to in-
form American cities’ policies because of the different privacy laws that 
exist in the U.K.  
A.  Why Washington, D.C. Is an Ideal Model for Other Cities 
First, Washington, D.C.’s program is large and it is expanding. Be-
cause the D.C. program is so large, it allows other jurisdictions to see a pro-
gram on a magnified scale. Based on D.C.’s large program, other jurisdic-
tions can glean best practices and anticipate and mitigate challenges that 
arise in the creation of CCTV programs.  
Second, Washington, D.C. experiences a unique threat; as the na-
tion’s capital it is home to some of the nation’s most critical assets and in-
frastructure, therefore making it an obvious target for terrorist attacks and 
essential to protect in the event of natural disasters.18 After the September 
11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon, the D.C. government became even more 
acutely aware of the need for situational awareness and recommitted itself 
to the safety of its residents and tourists. Because D.C. stands to lose so 
much, it has dedicated much attention to, and generated a high level of ex-
pertise in, developing a superior public safety program. Its use of CCTV 
may serve to inform less experienced jurisdictions in developing their pub-
lic safety programs, specifically with respect to the use of emerging CCTV 
technology.  
Third, because of the legal structure governing the D.C. Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA) regulation 
process, the D.C. CCTV program is subject to a heightened level of scruti-
ny; the program needs to (1) be efficient, both cost-wise and in delivering 
safety; and (2) be accepted by the Council of the District of Columbia 
  
 17  See Greenberger, supra note 15.  
 18  “The District of Columbia has been designated a high-threat target city by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, and needs commensurate capabilities for preventing, 
mitigating and responding to terrorist attacks. These capabilities include risk-based strategic 
planning, threat and vulnerability analysis, and gap assessments.” Homeland Security, Risk 
Reduction, and Preparedness Act of 2006 § 101(a) (D.C. 2006), available at http:// 
www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20061218162318.pdf. See also D.C. CODE 
§7-2205 (2010). 
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(Council) and their electorate.19 HSEMA needed to gain permission to use 
the regulations, so the regulations needed to be carefully drafted to become 
palatable to more stakeholders—this is a check rarely imposed when juris-
dictions draft CCTV regulations and implement programs. As a result, 
HSEMA’s comments submitted on the CCTV regulations—and the input 
from the other commenting organizations—influenced the regulations con-
siderably and were treated very seriously. Since D.C. works with more 
players at the table and more checks than many other jurisdictions, Wash-
ington, D.C.’s process can serve as an example to jurisdictions that need to 
adhere to more demanding procedures before implementing CCTV pro-
grams.  
Finally, Washington, D.C. boasts a unique culture of politically in-
volved, attentive residents who vigilantly watch and comment on issues in 
their community. This level of accountability required D.C. to build a strong 
program and communicate with the media to keep residents informed and 
allowed the agencies to benefit from active feedback. Other communities 
can benefit from this added perspective of heightened accountability and 
glean the best practices for responding to and addressing residents’ inquiries 
and concerns.  
B.  The Legal Process Behind Washington, D.C.’s CCTV Program 
The CCTV program in Washington, D.C. is defined by the city’s 
exposure to risk and its unique culture. The risk of being the seat of the na-
tion’s government and home to so many critical assets drove the decision to 
use more than 5,200 cameras in its CCTV program.20 Also, the emphasis the 
D.C. culture placed on the protection of civil liberties and privacy inspired 
the city’s collaboration with the Constitution Project21 in drafting the CCTV 
program’s regulations.22 Crime deterrence is certainly a priority to the Dis-
trict government, and inspiring confidence in the government’s ability to 
serve and protect residents, workers, commuters, and particularly tourists 
was a critical factor in Washington, D.C.’s decision to bolster its CCTV 
  
 19  Id. § 2-505 (providing the process by which the regulations are reviewed and passed).  
 20  Press Release, supra note 16. 
 21  The Constitution Project is a politically independent think tank established in 1997 to 
promote and defend the fundamental tenets of our nation’s founding document. On a wide 
range of matters, the Constitution Project assembles committees that span partisan divides, 
forging consensus and transforming it into bipartisan political coalitions and broader public 
support for safeguarding our Constitution. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY AS A COUNTERTERRORISM TOOL: CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS vii (2008), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/ man-
age/file/48.pdf. 
 22  D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 24, § 2500 (2010). 
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program.23 Much of the city’s revenue is derived from tourism, and after the 
September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon the city needed to make every 
effort not only to ensure residents’ and tourists’ physical safety, but also to 
allow them to feel safe within the city.  
Currently, D.C.’s CCTV program is divided into two separate parts 
that are governed by the same regulations. The Metropolitan Police De-
partment’s (MPD’s) cameras feed only to police officers in an MPD build-
ing, and all other agencies’ camera feeds stream to a fusion center located in 
a secured section of HSEMA’s offices.24 The regulations that MPD drafted 
with the Constitution Project currently govern both the MPD and HSEMA 
programs, although HSEMA has created several drafts of regulations to 
govern their interagency camera program aimed towards situational aware-
ness.25  
When HSEMA coordinated the D.C. agencies’ video streaming 
from interoperable cameras, the purpose was slightly different than that of 
MPD’s program. According to HSEMA: 
The mission of the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Agency is to manage the District’s emergency operations, to prevent, re-
spond to, and recover from natural and man-made emergencies.  
HSEMA coordinates all planning and preparedness efforts and generates a 
real-time common operating picture during events, to facilitate informed 
decision-making and response. This common operating picture achieves 
situational awareness and eliminates or minimizes conflicting information 
received from numerous sources.26 
If technology is going to be used to a different end, the means may 
vary. Accordingly, HSEMA drafted regulations to govern (1) the operating 
procedures for the circumstances under which recording is permissible; (2) 
the treatment of other agencies’ video feeds; and (3) the governance of em-
ployees monitoring the feeds.27 MPD, in contrast, is the primary crime re-
sponse agency and operates its own cameras without the assistance of other 
  
 23  Telephone Interview with Steven Kral, Senior Policy Advisor, District of Columbia 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (Oct. 20, 2009) (on file with au-
thor).  
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  HOMELAND SEC. AND EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FY09 PERFORMANCE PLAN 1 (2009), 
available at http://capstat.oca.dc.gov/docs/fy09/HSEMA.pdf (emphasis added). See also 
D.C. CODE § 7-2205 (2010).  
 27  Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, Use of Closed Circuit Tele-
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agencies;28 there are no novel issues or concerns about procedures for shar-
ing information and privacy protections in the MPD context. Because 
HSEMA created a different kind of program than MPD, consolidated differ-
ent agencies’ employees and video feeds in the same room for the exact 
purpose of sharing information, and sought to gain situational awareness—
which is more nuanced and encompasses more activity than merely moni-
toring criminal activity—the HSEMA program’s regulations needed to be 
tailored accordingly.  
The legal procedure for establishing CCTV regulations in Washing-
ton, D.C. is an anomaly in that the Council has the ability to delegate rule-
making authority to the executive branch while requiring that the drafted 
regulations be subject to Council review and even affirmative approval.29 
While the Council does not exercise this control over every agency or every 
set of regulations, it has subjected HSEMA’s CCTV program regulations to 
this extensive process.30 Once the agency that seeks to implement a program 
drafts its regulations, it publishes a Proposed Rule via the Executive Office 
of the Mayor for a thirty day public notice and comment period.31 If com-
ments regarding the program are significant and substantive, the agency 
amends the Proposed Rule and submits it for another thirty day notice and 
comment period.32 If there are neither significant nor substantive comments, 
then the Executive Office of the Mayor submits the Proposed Rule to the 
Council for review.33 The Council then has either thirty or forty-five days to 
review the Proposed Rule.34 If the Council requires affirmative approval for 
a program’s or an agency’s regulations, as it did for HSEMA’s CCTV pro-
gram, then the regulations are ineffective until the Council approves them. 
If the allotted review period closes without the Council’s express approval, 
the regulations remain ineffective.35 If the Council grants affirmative ap-
proval—which has not happened for HSEMA’s proposed CCTV regula-
  
 28  Interview with Steven Kral, supra note 23. See also District of Columbia Metropolitan 
Police Department, CCTV System Operations and Capabilities, http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/ 
cwp/view,a,1238,Q,541572,mpdcNav_GID,1545,mpdcNav,|31748|,.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 
2010). 
 29  This power held by the D.C. Council is derived from the Home Rule Act, which trans-
ferred all authorities of the former Commissioners to the current governing body. See gener-
ally D.C. CODE § 2-505; Home Rule Act, D.C. CODE §§ 1-203.02, 1-204.04, 1-303.01, 1-
303.03 (1973).  
 30  Interview with Steven Kral, supra note 23. 
 31  See D.C. CODE § 2-505(a).  
 32  See id.  
 33  See supra note 29.  
 34  Id.  
 35  Id.  
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tions—then the regulations are published for notice and comment as a Final 
Rule.36 
V. ADDRESSING OVERARCHING CONCERNS REGARDING CCTV POLICY 
When HSEMA released its proposed regulations for its CCTV pro-
gram, the submitted comments reflected the overarching concerns that are 
generally expressed over CCTV. Comments were submitted by the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Constitution Project.37 They fo-
cused their concerns on the constitutional implications and civil liberties 
issues that may arise with such a program, and HSEMA amended its Pro-
posed Rule to assuage those concerns.38  
Generally, when CCTV comes under public scrutiny, opponents 
express concerns about CCTV technology’s capabilities as a threat to 
people’s Fourth Amendment rights. However, CCTV programs do not im-
plicate the Fourth Amendment, as no person moving about public spaces 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.39 Government CCTV programs are 
established by placing cameras on public property—for example, on a lamp 
post—with a view of public space. Anyone viewing CCTV cameras can 
only view what a police officer on foot, or any person on the street, would 
be able to see. As technology develops, jurisdictions are able to purchase 
and place cameras throughout the area with pan-tilt-zoom capabilities, but a 
properly regulated CCTV program takes into consideration that any infor-
mation gathered by viewing areas that are not in plain view or in public 
space would not be able to be used in any sort of a criminal investigation, 
and would ensure that cameras are not placed in questionable areas.40 To be 
  
 36  Id.  
 37  The ACLU’s and the Constitution Project’s submitted written comments (July 21, 2008, 
November 26, 2008, and July 17, 2008, respectively) on HSEMA’s proposed rule are not 
published but may be accessed by sending a written request to HSEMA’s Public Information 
Officer.  
 38  These regulations are unpublished but may be accessed through a written request. See 
id.  
 39  “For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 40  In this way, cameras effectively function as a police officer would. In the unlikely in-
stance that a suit is brought based on a Fourth Amendment violation claim, a court may find 
that, like binoculars and flashlights, the camera is just another technological development 
that simply enhances plain view, only in this case an officer or a government employee view-
ing the video feed would be able to see whatever an officer there on the street would see. In 
fact, the very purpose of a CCTV program is to be more efficient than to try to have an offic-
er in all places at all times to see what could be viewed by one officer monitoring several 
video feeds.  
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even more transparent, the current trend in implementing CCTV program 
policy is to post publicly that an area is subject to video surveillance. In 
certain areas of Baltimore, signs are posted in monitored areas, while in 
Washington, D.C. HSEMA posts all locations of CCTV cameras on its 
website.41 HSEMA’s program thus allows people to research exactly where 
cameras are before they leave the house and to be aware of when and where 
they are monitored. For these reasons, Fourth Amendment privacy concerns 
should not hinder or in any way influence the implementation of a CCTV 
program.  
Critics’ other constitutional concerns stem from the First Amend-
ment, but CCTV programs should not infringe on these rights either. Certain 
interest groups have expressed concern that CCTV technology may allow 
government employees to focus cameras on groups assembling in public 
places, or zoom in on pamphlets or other literature that people carry, effec-
tively hindering people’s willingness to exercise their right to assemble or 
carry and distribute literature.42 However, regulations governing CCTV 
programs should expressly specify that any such targeting of people and 
their behavior, or zooming in on their pamphlets or other literature, is pro-
hibited. Thus, CCTV programs in and of themselves should neither pose a 
threat to, nor hinder, people’s willingness to exercise their First Amendment 
rights. Any constitutional issues raised would be marked by misuse of the 
program, which is in no way distinguishable from misuse of any other gov-
ernment program that results in constitutional violations.  
When HSEMA put its Proposed Rule out for comment, the ACLU 
and the Constitution Project responded with comments43 that paralleled the 
content of a Fall 2006 New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) report.44 
In Fall 2006, the NYCLU issued a special report entitled Who’s Watching? 
Video Camera Surveillance in New York City and the Need for Public Over-
sight.45 The report provides examples of circumstances under which some 
citizens might not want to be observed, much less recorded.46 According to 
the report, the NYCLU was primarily concerned that such a surveillance 
system would effectively “undermin[e] fundamental rights of privacy, 
speech, expression and association.”47  
  
 41  District of Columbia, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)—Situational Awareness, 
http://dcema.dc.gov/dcema/cwp/view,a,1225,q,644339.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2010). 
 42  See, e.g., supra note 37. 
 43  Id. 
 44  See generally NYCLU REPORT, supra note 6. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 1. 
 47  Id. 
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The NYCLU report includes a very helpful list of elements that 
should be considered when jurisdictions draft regulations governing their 
CCTV programs. The report includes the concerns that residents have and 
provides the academic perspective.48 The report is the most comprehensive 
guide that agencies can use to anticipate obstacles and work to find a com-
promise that inspires faith in government but maintains the capabilities of 
an effective CCTV program.  
First, the NYCLU suggests that jurisdictions state clear goals and 
purposes for CCTV programs.49 These goals should be based on a needs 
assessment performed before the cameras are installed and justified by peri-
odic audits of the efficacy of the cameras’ placements and adherence to the 
program’s regulations.50 Second, the report calls for public notice of the 
program, the location of the cameras, and the proposed locations for addi-
tional cameras so that the community may comment.51 Third, the NYCLU 
emphasizes that the regulations should require a training program and  
a system for vigilant supervision of the government employees tasked with 
monitoring the video feeds.52 Fourth, a jurisdiction’s regulations should 
explicitly state the recording, storing, and disposal policies for the videos, 
including the exact length of time permissible to keep a recording; ad-
ditionally, the NYCLU recommends that this section of the regulations  
address the circumstances under which recordings will be accessible and  
disseminated.53  
The NYCLU report devotes much attention to its fifth suggested 
section, prohibition and penalties.54 This section clearly defines what activi-
ty would constitute a misuse of CCTV technology, such as zooming in on 
fliers or pamphlets “being distributed or carried pursuant to First Amend-
ment rights,”55 and “target[ing] or observ[ing] individuals based upon race, 
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classifications pro-
tected by law.”56 The fifth section cautions that cameras observe only public 
areas where people enjoy no reasonable expectation of privacy, and recom-
mends that cameras must not have any audio capabilities.57 The lack of au-
dio capabilities is very important to agencies designing CCTV programs 
  
 48  See generally id. 
 49  Id. at 13–16. 
 50  Id. at 13. 
 51  Id. at 13–14. 
 52  Id. at 14–15. 
 53  Id. at 15–16. 
 54  Id. at 16. 
 55  Id.  
 56  Id.  
 57  Id. 
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and for interest groups alike, and must be stated in the regulations, as well 
as emphasized in town hall meetings and media releases.  
HSEMA’s most recent amendments to its Proposed Rule reflect all 
of the recommendations outlined in the NYCLU report and the comments 
HSEMA received.58 Though HSEMA’s amended regulations have not been 
affirmatively accepted by the Council, all CCTV cameras are currently go-
verned by MPD’s regulations, which were drafted with active participation 
from the Constitution Project, and delineate the same elements.59  
VI. CURRENT GOVERNING REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
MPD’s regulations,60 drafted collaboratively with the Constitution 
Project, serve the ultimate goal of traditional police powers and public safe-
ty response. All CCTV camera feeds are currently governed by these MPD 
regulations. Initially, MPD policy section 2500 appears to focus on achiev-
ing situational awareness, which is one HSEMA’s most critical functions. 
Section 2500.2 reads, “MPD’s CCTV system is generally intended to be 
used: (1) to help manage public resources during major public events and 
demonstrations; (2) to coordinate traffic control on an as-needed basis; and 
(3) to combat crime as authorized by § 2508.”61 Section 2508.1 provides 
that “[t]he Chief of Police is authorized to use the CCTV system for the 
purpose of preventing, detecting, deterring, and investigating crime in 
neighborhoods in the District of Columbia.”62 This section’s language ap-
pears to permit the mitigation aspect of HSEMA’s mission, and should be 
interpreted to allow HSEMA to create a common operating picture63 to en-
hance safety and stay abreast of action in critical, high-risk, or high-threat 
areas. Section 2501.2 addresses the sentiment that a video surveillance sys-
tem may not be as effective as having officers patrol the street. This section 
states that “[t]he technology will not be used to replace current policing 
techniques.”64 Otherwise stated, CCTV bolsters current safety programs 
rather than replacing them.  
After MPD’s regulations address the purpose of its CCTV program, 
they outline the policy governing it. The Council accepted MPD’s CCTV 
regulations in large part because of the Constitution Project’s heavy influ-
ence in drafting this section; not only is this one of the D.C. program’s 
greatest strengths, but also it provides a blueprint for other jurisdictions 
  
 58  Interview with Steven Kral, supra note 23. 
 59  See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 24, § 2501 (2010). 
 60  Id. § 2500. 
 61  Id. §2500.2.  
 62  Id. §2508.1 (emphasis added). 
 63  Supra note 5. 
 64  D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 24, § 2501.2. 
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attempting to draft regulations acceptable to civil liberties interest groups. 
The following sections directly reflect the guidelines from the NYCLU and 
the Constitution Project’s comments.  
2501.3 Under no circumstances shall the CCTV systems be used for the 
purpose of infringing upon First Amendment rights. 
2501.4 Operators of the CCTV systems shall not target/observe individu-
als solely because of their race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disa-
bility or other classifications protected by law. 
2501.5 CCTV systems shall be used to observe locations that are in public 
view and where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. 
2501.6 MPD shall not use audio in conjunction with the CCTV unless ap-
propriate court orders are obtained. 
2502.8 On a semi-annual basis, MPD will provide updates on the CCTV 
system at community meetings to be announced to the public. 
2502.9 MPD will provide information about the CCTV system and its 
usage in its Annual Report. The information shall include the viewing area 
of cameras, periods of activation and/or recording and the purposes of ac-
tivation and recording, disposition of any recordings, and an evaluation of 
whether the camera achieved the purposes stated in section 2500. The 
MPD shall not include any information pertaining to cameras deployed 
pursuant to a court order or deployed as part of an on-going criminal in-
vestigation. 
2504.4 Operators of CCTV systems shall not focus on hand bills, fliers, 
etc., being distributed or carried pursuant to First Amendment rights. 
2507.1 MPD’s Office of Professional Responsibility will conduct periodic 
audits, at least quarterly, to ensure compliance with these regulations. 
2507.2 The audits conducted pursuant to 2507.1 shall be provided to the 
Mayor and the Council of the District of Columbia.65 
The Operator Certification and Activation and Usage sections of the 
MPD regulations address the sensitive subject of who views the footage and 
how they do so. The regulations require the certification of all program op-
erators and provide that “[a]ll operators of the CCTV systems shall sign a 
certification that they have read and understand the CCTV regulations and 
acknowledge the potential criminal and/or administrative sanctions for un-
authorized use or misuse of the CCTV systems.”66 The regulations further 
state that: 
Anyone who engages in the unauthorized use or misuse of CCTV systems 
shall be subject to criminal prosecution and/or administrative sanctions, 
including termination. The administrative sanctions will depend on the se-
  
 65  Id. §§ 2501.3–.6, 2502.8–.9, 2504.4, 2507.1–.2. 
 66  Id. § 2503.2. 
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verity of the infraction and shall be taken in accordance with MPD’s Dis-
ciplinary Procedures and Policies General Order and/or the adverse and 
corrective action procedures as provided in the District Personnel Ma-
nual.67 
Recording policies are another focal point in developing CCTV pol-
icy. The circumstances under which the footage is permitted to be recorded 
and the storage of such tapes may garner much attention from the media, 
residents, and public interest groups, so agencies must be transparent with 
the program’s policies and be prepared to justify them. “Except in exigent 
circumstances or when recording is being done pursuant to a court order, the 
Chief of Police shall issue written authorization prior to recording any 
CCTV feed.”68 Additionally, MPD’s regulations require documentation for 
every recording: “[t]he record shall include a copy of any written author-
izations pertaining to each period of recording, the name(s) of any person(s) 
recording, a general description of the activity being recorded, and  
documentation as to when the recording began and ended.”69 If a recording  
is justified by exigent circumstances, documentation must describe  
“the exigency that gave rise to the need to record without prior written  
authorization.”70 
Any footage that is recorded pursuant to a CCTV program must be 
handled vigilantly; security is critical so as not to create civil liberties in-
fractions. Agencies must limit their retention of recordings, since indefinite 
retention of tapes that do not arouse suspicion is unreasonable. The MPD 
regulations cap retention at “10 business days after which time they will be 
recorded over or destroyed.”71 If the footage “contain[s] evidence of crimi-
nal activity, because the recordings capture an occurrence that may subject 
MPD to civil liability, or because the recording will be used for training 
purposes,” then it may be retained longer than ten business days.72 “Record-
ings that contain evidence of criminal activity or recordings that capture an 
occurrence that may subject MPD to civil liability shall be maintained to 
final case disposition.”73 The regulations require extensive documentation 
whenever such recordings are retained beyond the standard ten business day 
period.74  
  
 67  Id. § 2503.3. 
 68  Id. § 2505.1. 
 69  Id. § 2505.2. 
 70  Id. § 2505.3. 
 71  Id. § 2505.5. 
 72  Id. § 2505.6. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. §§ 2505.7–2505.8. 
File: Xenakis (#3).doc Created on: 5/11/2010 3:33:00 PM Last Printed: 5/11/2010 4:09:00 PM 
2010] WASHINGTON, D.C. AND CCTV 589 
With respect to the public notice issue, MPD’s regulations allow the 
public an opportunity to be heard, but vest the ultimate authority to add and 
place cameras in the Chief of Police. Section 2502.7 provides that “MPD 
will post and maintain signage”75 and section 2502.4 clearly empowers the 
Chief of Police by requiring that “[t]he Chief of Police shall consider the 
comments submitted by the public in determining whether to go forward 
with deployment of the camera. The Chief of Police will provide public 
notice of his decision and provide an explanation.”76 Ultimately, there is no 
further check on this authority; the Chief of Police’s explanation could be as 
simple as, “this will protect you, and does not violate any of your rights, so 
if MPD does not place a camera at [a location at issue], the agency is not 
performing due diligence.” Vesting such final decision making authority in 
the Chief of Police is unlikely to cause additional public concern, as people 
who oppose this grant of authority are likely to object to CCTV programs as 
a whole, and will not distinguish an additional camera from the existing 
program. 
VII. GAPS CAUSED BY USING REGULATIONS NOT DRAFTED FOR  
A UNIQUE PROGRAM 
The MPD regulations’ Public Notification section,77 along with 
several others,78 underscores the gaps that remain in a policy governed by 
regulations that were written before the program was fully formed. The sec-
tion of the MPD regulations vesting authority in the Chief of Police raises 
the following question: If HSEMA operates its consolidation of interagency 
cameras under these MPD regulations, in whom is this authority vested—
surely not the Chief of Police? It would be logical to infer that, since the 
Chief of Police is the director of MPD, and since the MPD regulations were 
  
 75  Id. § 2502.7. 
 76  Id. § 2502.4. 
 77  Id. § 2502. 
 78  See, e.g., id. § 2506.1 (“MPD shall be responsible for the safekeeping, maintenance and 
servicing of MPD equipment (e.g., cameras, cables, monitors, recorders, etc.).)”; id. § 2507.1 
(“MPD’s Office of Professional Responsibility will conduct periodic audits, at least quarter-
ly, to ensure compliance with these regulations.”); id. § 2503.3. 
Anyone who engages in the unauthorized use or misuse of CCTV systems shall be 
subject to criminal prosecution and/or administrative sanctions, including termina-
tion. The administrative sanctions will depend on the severity of the infraction and 
shall be taken in accordance with MPD’s Disciplinary Procedures and Policies 
General Order and/or the adverse and corrective action procedures as provided in 
the District Personnel Manual. 
Id.; id. § 2505.6 (“Recordings that contain evidence of criminal activity or recordings that 
capture an occurrence that may subject MPD to civil liability shall be maintained to final 
case disposition.”). 
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originally drafted to govern the program that MPD designed and oversaw, 
the authority with which the regulations provide the Chief of Police should 
apply to the director of the agency implementing the program—in this case, 
the director of HSEMA. However, some ambiguity remains because this 
issue is not directly addressed by MPD’s regulations, which were drafted 
specifically for its program and not HSEMA’s.  
The MPD regulations’ references to the Chief of Police comprise 
one of the many outstanding issues that remain with applying these regula-
tions to HSEMA’s CCTV program. As strong as the MPD regulations are, 
they leave something to be desired when they are applied to the HSEMA-
coordinated interagency CCTV program because they were not crafted spe-
cifically for the program HSEMA has designed. Requiring HSEMA and its 
system of interagency camera monitoring to operate under MPD’s regula-
tions is further complicated by section 2508.4, which reads, “[w]hen CCTV 
is used to combat crime, recordings may be passively monitored, meaning 
that the video feeds may not be monitored in real time, and recordings may 
be viewed by MPD personnel where there is reason to believe that the view-
ing may help solve a crime.”79 This provision entirely undermines 
HSEMA’s objective to create situational awareness and mitigate any devel-
oping threat. While proscribing active monitoring may be entirely appropri-
ate for police cameras, which serve a distinctly different purpose and are 
excluded from the collaborative HSEMA program, it is fundamentally inap-
propriate to hold HSEMA’s program to this active-monitoring restriction 
when HSEMA, because of Washington, D.C.’s heightened risk, has been 
tasked with maintaining situational awareness. Passive monitoring and the 
use of recordings to solve crimes indicate a clearly reactive role; by defini-
tion, one can only solve a crime that has already been committed. The lan-
guage in section 2508.4 dramatically limits HSEMA’s ability to fulfill its 
responsibility to mitigate developing situations and disregards any responsi-
bility to monitor developing natural disasters. Though the language success-
fully establishes an effective MPD camera program, it does not serve 
HSEMA’s purposes. The two distinct programs require separate regulations. 
The language in the MPD regulations directly serves a police program and 
directly interferes with HSEMA’s mission to maintain awareness to preempt 
incidents.  
The current saving grace for HSEMA’s program lies in section 
2500.3, which reads, “[i]n addition to the purposes listed in 2500.2, the 
CCTV system may also be employed in exigent circumstances for the dura-
tion of the exigent event or circumstance.”80 One could argue that ever since 
September 11, 2001, the nation’s capital has been in an ongoing state of 
  
 79  Id. § 2508.4 (emphasis added). 
 80  Id. § 2500.3. 
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vigilance. As the seat of the American government and home to so many 
terrorist targets, D.C. is arguably in a constantly exigent circumstance (as 
distinguished from another city of similar size). 
Three salient inconsistencies regarding D.C.’s CCTV program re-
main and need to be addressed in order to have a solid and transparent pro-
gram. These are issues that are not unique to Washington, D.C. but need to 
be considered for any program aiming to achieve situational awareness 
through a shared, interagency network of camera feeds.  
First, the responsibility for storage and security of recorded footage 
needs to be clarified—either the coordinating agency (in Washington, D.C., 
HSEMA) must handle this or each agency must be responsible for its own 
camera feeds.  
Second, MPD’s reference to “exigent circumstances” is a nebulous 
concept; one could argue that the definition of exigency is influenced by the 
mission of the agency and of the program. Agencies serve different roles 
and therefore have different priorities. An exigent circumstance (warranting 
recording and retaining the footage) for a police department with specific 
objectives may be different than what constitutes an exigent circumstance 
for an emergency management and homeland security program. Situational 
awareness is a much more nuanced goal, and it is informed by many differ-
ent elements of activity within a city. Ignoring these nuances, or ignoring 
that exigency may be defined by the perspective and the role with which an 
agency approaches a situation, at best adds a level of opaqueness to the reg-
ulations and at worst limits an important agency’s delivery of a critical gov-
ernment service. It is wasteful and dangerous to limit execution of a gov-
ernment program based upon poorly worded or thought-out regulations  
Third, MPD’s regulations fall short due to section 2503.1, “[o]nly 
certified operators shall operate the CCTV system.”81 A regulation requiring 
any employee who monitors the CCTV cameras to be certified, without 
identifying some structure or criteria for certification, is utterly unquantifia-
ble and essentially meaningless. “Certification” could mean nothing more 
than a stamp on a stack of unread papers. Without recreating the Napoleonic 
Code, programs would be stronger and civil liberties would be more robust-
ly protected with more guidelines or standards included when requiring 
certification. Enough jurisdictions have created templates for such training 
and vetting programs as to make this a realistic, rather than an unduly bur-
densome, addition to a jurisdiction’s regulations.  
Careful examination of the way Washington, D.C. has structured 
and implemented its CCTV program should reinforce the importance of 
clearly identifying the purpose for a city’s CCTV programs and producing 
regulations tailored to achieve that goal. 
  
 81  Id. § 2503.1. 
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VIII. THE WAY FORWARD 
For CCTV technology to be used most effectively, it must be used 
efficiently while maintaining people’s faith in government—faith that they 
are safe, that their taxes are being spent on programs that enhance public 
safety, and that their civil liberties are not being compromised in the 
process. To craft the best policy for a CCTV program, and to present the 
best argument and the most accurate picture of the technology’s ability to 
serve public safety needs (which is critical for jurisdictions in which the 
initiating agency needs approval of regulations from a separate governing 
body), an agency must clearly identify its program’s purpose, its goals, and 
the steps it will take to implement them. The regulations must be transparent 
and overt, and must include language to protect civil liberties in an effort to 
address the concerns regarding misuse of CCTV technology. The agency 
must identify the reasons as to why their goals cannot be better served in a 
seemingly less pervasive or less expensive way. Although agencies must 
tailor the policy to their unique programs, they should look to leading au-
thorities on civil liberties and existing CCTV programs for best practices.  
Finally, agencies must prepare for the peripheral impact that a 
CCTV program carries. Citizens may make Freedom of Information Act 
requests for recorded CCTV footage, and attorneys may subpoena either 
recordings or government employees who watched an incident unfold on a 
CCTV monitor. Such requests may be made under federal or state law, and 
may be made for criminal or civil litigation purposes.82 To maintain the 
integrity of a CCTV program, and to use it truly for the most noble and es-
sential safety purposes, there must be a way to protect such footage from 
use in trivial civil litigation. It is unlikely that a municipality’s homeland 
security agency regulations will override the laws governing such requests, 
but the agency has a responsibility to maintain the privacy protections en-
sured by the regulations governing the program.  
Along the same vein, agencies will need to work together to imple-
ment an effective CCTV program. Financial decisions concerning the tech-
nology to be purchased and questions regarding distribution of authority and 
human resources may arise when members of different agencies are dep-
loyed to a fusion center. A municipality may need to update its building 
code when it implements the CCTV program; if cameras are placed strateg-
ically, and then a new structure is built that impedes the CCTV camera’s 
access to a critical asset, there must be a way to ensure that another camera 
can be placed even if the new building is privately owned. In these respects, 
as in others, implementing an effective CCTV program is an interagency 
  
 82  See generally Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).  
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undertaking. Jurisdictions must be prepared to address these peripheral is-
sues if the technology is to be used successfully.  
CCTV programs can only become stronger and more effective as 
jurisdictions share information with each other and with the community. By 
analyzing existing CCTV programs, seriously considering comments and 
concerns, and crafting effective yet sensitive programs, agencies can fully 
perform their most essential task: enhancing public safety while protecting 
civil liberties. In this way, CCTV programs can build safer communities.  
 
